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NOTE 
The Case Against Intermediate Owner Liability Under 
CERCLA for Passive Migration of Hazardous Waste 
Robert L. Bronston 
INTRODUCTION 
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)1 to address 
the dangers posed by inactive hazardous waste sites.2 CERCLA 
imposes both strict liability and joint and several liability3 for envi-
ronmental damage on four general categories of potentially respon-
sible partjes (PRPs).4 The four categories of PRPs include present 
owners of environmentally contaminated facilities,5 prior owners of 
a facility who owned it at the time it was used for hazardous waste 
1. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 
(1988)). 
2. See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119 (stating that CERCLA's purpose is "to provide for a national in-
ventory of inactive hazardous waste sites and ... to protect public health and the environ-
ment from the dangers posed by such sites"); see also Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & 
Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 841 (4th Cir.) ("Congress enacted CERCLA to address the increasing 
environmental and health problems associated with inactive hazardous waste sites."), cert. 
denied, 113 S. Ct. 377 (1992). Hazardous waste sites become "inactive" when they stop ac-
cepting discarded material. Congress addressed the problem of active hazardous waste sites 
in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 
Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1988)). 
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1988) (providing that liability "shall be construed to be the 
standard of liability which obtains under" § 311 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 
(1988)). Although the statutory language is less than clear, courts have interpreted § 311 of 
the Clean Water Act to impose strict liability. See, e.g., United States v. LeBeouf Bros. Tow-
ing Co., 621 F.2d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 906 (1981); Steuart Transp. 
Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609, 613 (4th Cir. 1979). Similarly, courts have inter-
preted CERCLA's liability provision, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1988), to impose strict liability 
under CERCLA. See, e.g., O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 182 n.9 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 
493 U.S. 1071 (1990); Idaho v. Hanna Mining Co., 882 F.2d 392, 394 (9th Cir. 1989); United 
States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1377 (8th Cir. 1989) ("Most courts have 
held CERCLA imposes strict liability and joint and several liability."). Although CERCLA 
imposes strict liability upon potentially responsible parties, certain causation-based defenses 
remain available to such parties. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b )(1)-( 4) (1988); see also infra note 11. 
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l)-(4) (1988). CERCLA often refers to persons who may be 
liable under these provisions as "potentially responsible parties." See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9613(g)(l)(b) (1988). 
5. This category of PRPs includes anyone who is "the owner and operator of a vessel or a 
facility." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l) (1988). 
609 
610 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 93:609 
disposal,6 those owners of hazardous waste who contract for its re-
moval,7 and any transporter of hazardous waste.8 
Federal courts have divided over the scope of liability of prior 
owners who did not actively contribute to the contamination of their 
land. This controversy arises in one common factual context. In 
this scenario, the original owner of the land generates hazardous 
waste and thereby contaminates the property. A second owner 
then uses the land for a different purpose, does not create any new 
waste, and is not aware of the previous contamination.9 During the 
second owner's tenure, the previously deposited hazardous material 
spreads via leaching or migration. Fmally, a third owner assumes 
control of the land and retains ownership at the time of the re-
quired remedial activity. 
Liability clearly rests both on the person who dumped the haz-
ardous material10 and, in all but a narrow range of situations, on the 
third, or current, property owner.11 The liability of the second 
owner, however, presents a more difficult problem. CERCLA sec-
tion 107(a)(2), the prior owner provision, imposes liability on those 
who owned the land "at the time of disposal."12 Thus, in order to 
determine the liability of intermediate owners, courts must deter-
mine whether the term disposal as used in the prior owner provi-
sion requires active conduct on the part of the owner or whether it 
also includes the passive leaching or migration of previously depos-
ited waste. 
Federal courts have split on how to interpret disposal. The ma-
jority view, adopted by the Fourth Circuit, employs a passive defini-
tion, which holds that even passive migration of hazardous waste 
6. This category of PRPs includes "any person who at the time of disposal of any hazard-
ous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were dis-
posed of." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988). 
7. This category of PRPs includes "any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise 
arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal 
or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(a)(3) (1988). 
8. This category of PRPs includes "any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous 
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988). 
9. If the intermediate owner becomes aware of the contamination of her land, she faces 
liability under CERCLA § 101(35)(C). See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C) (1988); see also infra 
notes 117-20 and accompanying text. This Note addresses only the situation in which the 
intermediate owner does not know that her land is contaminated. 
10. Because the polluter owned or operated the site at the time of disposal, she therefore 
faces liability under§ 107(a)(2). See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988); see also supra note 6 and 
accompanying text. 
11. The present owner faces liability under§ 107(a)(l) unless she can prove that she was 
covered by one of the causation defenses: that the disposal was caused by an act of God, by 
war, by a third party, or by some combination thereof. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l), (b)(l)-(4) 
(1988). 
12. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988). 
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may trigger section 107(a)(2) liability.13 Several district courts and 
bankruptcy courts, however, have applied an active definition of 
disposal, holding that only prior owners who contribute to the risk 
of environmental contamination by an intentional act should face 
liability.14 Under this view, an intermediate owner who did not ac-
tively contribute to the contamination of the site should face no 
liability because the migration of the hazardous waste did not result 
from any of her actions. Courts have recently issued opinions on 
both sides of the issue.15 Also, as the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) continues to discover more sites at which passive 
underground migration has occurred over several years,16 the fact 
pattern at issue will tend to recur. 
This Note argues that Congress intended disposal to have an 
active meaning and therefore that courts should not hold prior in-
termediate owners liable for the passive migration of hazardous 
waste under section 107(a)(2). Part I examines CERCLA's defini-
tion of disposal. This Part concludes that the language of the defini-
tion, though somewhat ambiguous, supports the active defuiition. 
Part II considers the history of both CERCLA and the Resource 
13. See Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 844-46 (4th Cir.), 
cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 377 (1992); CPC Intl. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1269, 
1278 (W.D. Mich. 1991}; Stanley Works v. Snydergeneral Corp., 781 F. Supp. 659, 660-64 
(E.D. Cal. 1990}; In re Hemingway Transp., Inc., 108 B.R. 378, 381-82 (Banlcr. D. Mass. 
1989), affd., 126 B.R. 656 (D. Mass. 1991}, modified, 993 F.2d 915 (1st Cir.}, cert denied, 114 
S. Ct. 303 {1993); cf. United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 164-65 {4th Cir. 1984) 
(applying the passive definition in the RCRA context); United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 
1055, 1070-71 (D.NJ. 1981) {holding that disposal as defuied in RCRA includes passive mi-
gration), affd., 688 F.2d 204 {3d Cir. 1982). 
14. See, e.g., United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1350-53 
(N.D. Ill. 1992); Snediker Developers Ltd. Partnership v. Evans, 773 F. Supp. 984, 989 (E.D. 
Mich. 1991}; In re Diamond Reo Trucks, Inc., 115 B.R. 559, 565 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990); 
Ecodyne Corp. v. Shah, 718 F. Supp. 1454, 1456-58 {N.D. Cal. 1989}; Cadillac Fairview/Cali-
fornia, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Co., 21 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1108, 1113 {C.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 
1984), revd. on other grounds, 840 F.2d 691 {9th Cir. 1988). 
15. Compare Nurad, 966 F.2d at 844-46 {adopting the passive definition) with Petersen 
Sand & Grave~ 806 F. Supp. at 1351 (applying the active definition). Recently, the Ninth 
Circuit expressly deferred rendering a decision on this issue. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. 
Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338, 1342 n.7 (9th Cir. 1992} ("Because the present 
case involves the active disposal of hazardous material, we do not consider the passive migra-
tion question."). 
16. See, e.g., Ralph Odenwald, Environmental Cleanup, N.M. Bus. J., July 1994, at 15, 15 
(revealing that "New Mexico ... is uncovering hundreds of hazardous underground storage 
leaks" and that "[n]ew leak sites are being discovered at a rate of five to 10 a week"}; Under-
ground Storage Tanks: Guide To Evaluate Contaminated Sites and Quantify Risk Debated at 
Workship, Cal. Envtl. Daily {BNA} {Aug. 16, 1994} {"In California there are approximately 
19,000 sites contaminated by underground tank petroleum spills."}, available in Westlaw, 
BNA-CED database. See generally Lois N. Epstein, Prepared Testimony on H.R. 1360, Safe 
Aboveground Storage Tanlc Act of 1993, Before the Subcomm. on Transportation and Haz-
ardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce (Sept. 14, 1994), available 
in LEXIS, News library, Curnws File {discussing what industry and the states are doing to 
address the problems posed by leaking aboveground storage tank facilities, why those actions 
are insufficient, and why the EPA lacks the power to deal adequately with this problem). 
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Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),17 which CERCLA 
amended, in order to determine whether Congress intended to re-
quire affirmative conduct on the part of intermediate owners as a 
prerequisite to liability. Part II concludes that although the history 
of CERCLA sheds little direct light on the meaning of disposal, the 
analogous controversy under RCRA indicates that Congress under-
stood disposal to have an active meaning in the CERCLA statute. 
Part III confirms this interpretation, concluding that the structure 
of CERCLA supports the active reading of the definition. Finally, 
Part IV demonstrates that the active reading of disposal is consist-
ent with CERCLA's purposes. Courts should therefore interpret 
the word disposal to require a showing of affirmative human con-
duct before imposing liability on intermediate owners under section 
107(a)(2). 
I. THE LANGUAGE OF THE DEFINITION 
In interpreting and applying statutes, a court must first consider 
the statutory language.18 If the relevant words have a clear mean-
ing in their context, this meaning should, and arguably must, con-
trol.19 To determine the scope of liability assessed under section 
107(a)(2), courts must interpret its use of the term disposal. CER-
CLA defines disposal by incorporating the definition used in 
RCRA:20 
The term "disposal" means the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, 
spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into 
or on any land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or 
any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into 
the air or discharged into any waters, including ground waters.21 
This Part examines whether this definition of disposal provides a 
sufficiently clear meaning to end the inquiry. Section I.A considers 
the argument that this language mandates a passive definition of 
disposal. Section l.B considers the opposing arguments, that the 
language of the statute suggests an active interpretation. This Part 
concludes that the statutory language does not have a "plain mean-
17. 42 u.s.c. §§ 6901-6987 (1988). 
18. Pennsylvania Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 557-58 (1990) (refer-
ring to the "fundamental canon that statutory interpretation begins with the language of the 
statute itself"}; Mallard v. United States Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 300 (1989) ("Interpretation 
of a statute must begin with the statute's language."). 
19. See, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) ("[W]here, as 
here, the statute's language is plain, 'the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according 
to its terms.'" (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917))). 
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1988). CERCLA defines disposal in § 101: "The terms 'dis-
posal', 'hazardous waste', and 'treatment' shall have the meaning provided in section 1004 of 
the Solid Waste Disposal Act.'' 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) (1988). The incorporated definition is 
the one provided in the text. 
21. 42 u.s.c. § 6903(3) (1988). 
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ing," although the best reading of the text favors the active defini-
tion of disposal. 
A. Statutory Language Supporting a Passive Reading 
Courts applying the passive interpretation of disposal have re-
lied on the inclusion of the word leaking in the definition of dispo-
sal. These courts reason that because CERCLA defines disposal to 
include leaking - a word which typically does not denote active 
human conduct - disposal must not require active human con-
duct.22 One district court23 that relied on this analysis when con-
struing the word leaking in a state statute virtually identical to 
CERCLA and designed for the same purposes summarized the ar-
gument as follows: 
"Leaking" does not commonly imply an intentional act. Rusted bar-
rels, radiators, [underground storage tanks] each may "leak" without 
anyone's aid or knowledge; moreover, an unseen or unintended grav-
ity-aided release from these containers would most naturally be called 
a "leak." Were one purposefully to refer solely to a controlled or 
intentional release of some substance, one would almost never use the 
term "leak" to capture that meaning .... Therefore, the word "leak-
ing," by itself, plainly includes and likely connotes an unintentional or 
inadvertent release.24 
This reasoning, however, does not acknowledge that the defini-
tion of leaking includes both an active component - "to let a sub-
stance (as water or gas) or light in or out througb. a hole, crevice, or 
other opening"25 - and a passive version --;- "to enter or escape 
through a hole, crevice, or other opening."26 When construed in 
the active sense, the word leak thus implies an affirmative human 
action that facilitates the escape of the substance. One could say, 
22. See, e.g., CPC Intl., Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1269, 1278 (W.D. 
Mich. 1991) ("The definition of 'disposal' adopted in CERCLA expressly includes 'spilling' 
and 'leaking.' Therefore, the unchecked spread of contaminated groundwater ... qualifies as 
disposal." (citations omitted)); cf. United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1071 (D.NJ. 
1981) (holding in a RCRA case that "[b]y its plain language, the statute authorizes relief 
restraining further disposal, i.e., leaking, of hazardous wastes from the landfill into the 
groundwaters"), ajfd., 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982). 
23. Pantry, Inc. v. Stop-n-Go Foods, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 1171 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (construing a 
Kentucky state environmental statute that defined disposal in a manner virtually identical to 
CERCLA), vacated, 844 F. Supp. 1338 (S.D. Ind. 1994). See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-
010(10) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991 & 1994) (" 'Disposal' means the discharge, deposit, in-
jection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any waste into or on any land or water so 
that such waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into the 
air or discharged into any waters, including ground waters."). 
24. 796 F. Supp. at 1177. 
25. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW lNTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN· 
GUAGE, UNABRIDGED 1285 (Philip Babcock Gove & the Merriam-Webster Editorial Staff 
eds., 1986). 
26. Id. Note that the verb to leak would be transitive under the active construction and 
intransitive under the passive construction. 
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for example, "the owner of the tank leaked the oil by drilling a 
small hole in the tank" or "the White House aide leaked the infor-
mation to the press." In ordinary usage the distinction between the 
two definitions rarely seems relevant. When construing CERCLA, 
however, the choice between these definitions may determine the 
result of a case in which a landowner has performed no affirmative 
act to let the hazardous waste escape.27 
Plain-meaning analysis cannot justify the selection of one possi-
ble definition and the rejection of other plausible alternatives. The 
district court quoted above acknowledged later in the same opinion 
that leaking could be subject to an active construction; but the court 
maintained both that the passive definition was the more common 
usage and that slight ambiguity should not disturb statutory analy-
sis.28 Once one acknowledges a plausible alternative reading of the 
statute, however, its meaning becomes less than "plain," and courts 
should tum to other sources of congressional intent to interpret the 
statute.29 
Under another approach to construing the meaning of leaking, 
and thus the meaning of disposal, some courts have arrived at a 
passive construction by inferring from other words in the defini-
tional list that Congress intended the definition of disposal to en-
compass a wide variety of phenomena.30 This argument emphasizes 
27. It is also possible for even unintentional affirmative acts by prior landowners to incur 
liability. See infra note 39. 
28. Pantry, Inc., 796 F. Supp. at 1177 ("[O)ne might be quick to argue that it is possible or 
reasonable to interpret the term 'leaking' to include an affirmative, intentional act also. That 
fact does not create any relevant 'ambiguity'."). 
29. If a statute is ambiguous - that is, susceptible to more than one plausible interpreta· 
tion - courts must seek out other sources of congressional intent, such as legislative history 
or the structure and purposes of the statute as a whole. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 
U.S. 470, 485 {1917) ("Where the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning, 
the duty of interpreta!ion does not arise."); Bradley v. Austin, 841 F.2d 1288, 1293 (6th Cir. 
1988) {"If we find that the statutory language is unambiguous, then that language is regarded 
as conclusive unless there is a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary. If we find 
that the statute is ambiguous, we then look to its legislative history." (citations omitted)); 
Johnson v. Town of1fail Creek, 771 F. Supp. 271, 276 (N.D. Ind.1991) {"When the statutory 
language is ambiguous on its face ..• the court should look to congressional intent in adopt-
ing the provision."); In re Great N. Forest Prods., Inc., 135 B.R. 46, 65 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 
1991) ("Frrst, is the statute plain and unambiguous? •.. If the answer is negative, the court 
must use all efforts to determine Congress' intent and obtain the best result."). In other 
words, if the language does allow for more than one plausible reading, proper statutory inter-
pretation requires the use of additional analytical tools. 
30. See, e.g., Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845 (4th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 377 (1992). The Fourth Circuit relied on this same argument in an 
earlier case construing the definition of disposal in RCRA: 
The inclusion of "leaking" as one of the diverse definitional components of "dispo-
sal" demonstrates that Congress intended "disposal" to have a range of meanings, in-
cluding conduct, a physical state, and an occurrence. Discharging, dumping, and 
injection (conduct), hazardous waste reposing (a physical state) and movement of the 
waste after it has been placed in a state of repose (an occurrence) are all encompassed in 
the broad definition of disposal. "Leaking" ordinarily occurs when landfills are not con-
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the diversity rather than the commonality of the words comprising 
the disposal definition. The definitional elements of terms like 
spilling and leaking differ - in their passive nature - from other 
verbs used in the list that require an actor. Thus, the argument 
runs, one can infer that Congress intended the passive meaning of 
leaking because such an interpretation furthers the breadth of di-
versity of the words Congress chose to include in the definition. 
The order of the words within the definitional list, however, may 
actually indicate that Congress intended the opposite. The place-
ment of spilling and leaking between two active verbs - the words 
dumping and placing31 - may suggest that Congress intended to 
minimize, rather than to emphasize, the passive aspects.32 
Thus, whether one focuses on the "plain meaning" of leaking, or 
on the context of the term, a critical reading of the statutory text 
does not obviously require the adoption of a definition of leaking 
that would hold prior intermediate owners liable for passive migra-
tion of hazardous waste. The next section examines the arguments 
made from the opposite perspective - that the language alone sup-
ports an active reading of disposal. 
B. Statutory Language Supporting an Active Reading 
Two separate approaches suggest that CERCLA's statutory lan-
guage requires a showing of affirmative human conduct before lia-
bility can attach to prior owners under section 107(a)(2). Under the 
first approach, one can construe the statute according to recognized 
canons of statutory construction to implement the common ele-
ments of the words in the definition. Under the second approach, 
one can focus upon the definition as a whole to determine Con-
gress's intent. This section argues that these two approaches pro-
vide helpful evidence in support of the active interpretation of 
disposal. 
structed soundly or when drums and tank trucks filled with waste materials corrode, rust, 
or rot. Thus "leaking" is an occurrence included in the meaning of "disposal." 
United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 164 (4th Cir. 1984). Although less than 
entirely clear - particularly with respect to the "physical state" element of "hazardous waste 
reposing" - this argument relies upon the assumption that the words in the definition should 
be given as broad a construction as possible. 
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1988). 
32. By interpreting the word leaking as widely divergent from, rather than consistent 
with, its surrounding language, the Waste Industries court also violated the maxim noscitur a 
sociis. See infra note 33 and accompanying text. Of course, a contrary canon suggests that 
statutes should be interpreted in such a way as not to render any words superfluous. See 
infra note 43. But cf. infra text accompanying note 39 (demonstrating how leaking can be 
read consistently with surrounding words and yet still have nonsuperfluous meaning). 
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1. Two Canons That Support an Active Reading 
One method of evaluating the meaning of disposal involves in-
terpreting the word leaking by attempting to render it consistent 
with the other words in the definition in accordance with the princi-
ple of noscitur a sociis, which maintains that one may infer the 
meaning of a word by examining the meanings of the surrounding 
words.33 According to this principle, the words discharge, deposit, 
injection, dumping, and placing indicate the proper connotation of 
spilling and leaking. Examining all of the words together illustrates 
Congress's intent: all the verbs are transitive and appear to envi-
sion a human actor.34 The principle of noscitur a sociis indicates 
that by including leak and spill among this group of words, Con-
gress likely intended the active version of these verbs to apply. 
Concluding otherwise would make leak and spill anomalous in the 
context of the definition. 
Another canon of statutory construction also favors the active 
reading of disposal. The principle of ejusdem generis35 states that 
when general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of 
things, the general words are most properly construed as applying 
to the same class of things as those enumerated. The district court 
in United States v. Waste Industries36 applied this principle to the 
disposal definition by interpreting leaking to encompass uninten-
tional but active conduct: 
33. The Supreme Court has relied upon this principle of statutory construction: "The 
maxim noscitur a sociis, that a word is known by the company it keeps, while not an ines· 
capable rule, is often wisely applied where a word is capable of many meanings in order to 
avoid the giving of unintended breadth to Acts of Congress." Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 
367 U.S. 303, 306-07 (1961) (construing the word discovery in§ 456 (a)(2)(B) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1939 to mean only the discovery of mineral resources because of its prox-
imity to the words exploration and prospecting); see also Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 
U.S. 26, 36 (1990) (construing the phrase reporting and recordkeeping requirements in the 
Paperwork Reduction Act not to encompass disclosure rules because of its proximity to the 
phrases information collection request and collection of information). 
34. In applying noscitur a sociis to the disposal definition, one district court made the 
following observations: 
[T]he Court looks at its definitional components and finds that these three nouns (dis· 
charge, deposit, and injection) and four gerunds (dumping, spilling, leaking, and plac-
ing), when read together, all have in common the idea that someone do something with 
hazardous substances. Taking the clearest example, the Court notes that "placing'', read 
in the context of the statute, means a person introducing - putting - formerly con-
trolled or contained hazardous substances into the environment. 
Ecodyne Corp. v. Shah, 718 F. Supp. 1454, 1457 (N.D. Cal. 1989). 
35. The Supreme Court has relied upon ejusdem generis when interpreting statutes: 
"Under the principle of ejusdem generis, when a general term follows a specific one, the 
general term should be understood as a reference to subjects akin to the one with specific 
enumeration." Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. American Train Dispatchers' Assn., 499 U.S. 117, 
129 (1991); see also Smith v. Davis, 323 U.S.111, 117 (1944) ("And, under the rule of ejusdem 
generis, it is reasonable to construe the general words 'other obligations' •.. as referring only 
to obligations or securities of the same type as those specifically enumerated."). 
36. 556 F. Supp. 1301(E.D.N.C.1982), revel., 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984). For a discus-
sion of the Fourth Circuit opinion that overruled this district court opinion, see supra note 30. 
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Using ... the principle of ejusdem generis, general terms, i.e. leak and 
spill, must be read as containing the.elements common to the specific 
terms, i.e. deposit, inject, dump, and place. That common element is 
an act carried out by a person. Leak and spill evince the legislative 
purpose not to require that the act have been intentional. Even under 
the statutory definition, disposal requires someone's active conduct, 
whether intentional or accidental, in the movement of hazardous 
waste. Thus, the notion that each term contained in the definition of 
disposal contemplates active conduct ·does not render terms such as 
leak or spill superfluous. Those terms serve to provide broad cover-
age of disposal-related activities, so that one may not avoid liability by 
pleading that the conduct was unintentionaI.37 
This argument provides a nonredundant reading of leaking. For if 
leaking and spilling require both active conduct and intent to cause 
the consequences of the action, they add very little to the other 
words - discharge, deposit, injection, dumping and placing - al-
ready included in the statutory definition.38 If leaking refers to af-
firmative conduct the results of which were not intended by the 
actor, then each word in the definition would have independent 
effect.39 
These two principles of statutory construction suggest that 
CERCLA requires a showing of affirmative human conduct before 
liability under secti<?n 107(a)(2) may properly be imposed. This un-
derstanding of the term disposal receives additional support from 
language that appears at the end of the statutory definition, consid-
ered in the next section. 
2. The Significance of the "Enter the Environment" Language 
Focusing analysis on the use of the word leaking in the defini-
tional list tends to obscure the importance of additional language at 
the end of the definition. This language provides a valuable win-
dow into congressional intent. The full definition reads as follows: 
The term "disposal" means the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, 
spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into 
or on any land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or 
any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into 
the air or discharged into any waters, inCluding ground waters.40 
37. 556 F. Supp. at 1306 (emphasis added). 
38. Providing a nonredundant reading of leaking is preferable because it gives effect to 
every word in the statute. See infra note 43. 
39. Although the concept of an affirmative act that has the unintended consequence of 
disposing of hazardous waste may at first seem difficult to envision, such cases do arise. See, 
e.g., Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1573 (5th Cir. 
1988} (holding that a disposal may occur when a developer accidentally exacerbates contami-
nation of a plot of land by preparing it for commercial development). Note also that the 
actor would still intend to perform the action that causes the disposal. 
40. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1988} (emphasis added}. 
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The italicized language indicates that Congress envisioned two con-
ceptually distinct phases in the process of environmental contami-
nation. In the first stage, the polluter "disposes" of the waste, such 
as by burying barrels at a waste site. This disposal renders the tox-
ins capable of entering the environment - that is to say, it creates 
the risk of eventual contamination. In the second stage, the hazard-
ous pollution actually leaches or migrates into the environment.41 
These two stages may occur simultaneously - the risk may actual-
ize instantly - as would be the case if a landowner poured a barrel 
of hazardous waste into a pond on the property. Such an action 
undoubtedly constitutes a disposal. The language quoted above, 
however, suggests that the second phase alone cannot be considered 
a disposal. The actor must have created the risk of environmental 
contamination to have disposed of the waste. The definition's 
structure is essentially equivalent to defining disposal as the crea-
tion of an environmental risk "so that" such risk may materialize. 
Holding that the process of migration itself constitutes a dispo-
sal would render the entire second half of the definition meaning-
less. The passive definition necessarily presupposes that a disposal 
can consist of a direct emission of toxins from a container into the 
environment without any action of the intermediate owner in creat-
ing the risk. Such a construction of the statute assigns no meaning 
to the phrase "so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any 
constituent thereof may enter the environment."42 This construc-
tion violates the established canon of statutory construction that 
courts must read statutes in such a way as not to render any words 
superfluous. 43 
Thus, a number of arguments militate in favor of interpreting 
the statutory language to require active conduct on the part of in-
termediate owners before imposing liability. Although the active 
construction of disposal seems more convincing, the plausibility of 
the passive reading may prevent textual analysis from being solely 
determinative.44 When the plain language of a statute is less than 
crystal clear, courts often turn to the history of the statute to deter-
41. CERCLA refers to this second stage in isolation as a "release." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) 
(1988). For a structural analysis of the light which the release definition throws upon the 
meaning of disposa~ see infra notes 101-10 and accompanying text. 
42. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) {1988) (emphasis added). 
43. The Supreme Court has reaffirmed this principle on many occasions. See, e.g., United 
States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1011, 1015 {1992) (referring to "the settled rule that a 
statute must, if possible, be construed in such fashion that every word has some operative 
effect"); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 {1955) (holding that it is a court's 
"duty 'to give effect if possible to every clause and word of a statute'" (quoting Montclair v. 
Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 {1883))); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 
(1936) ("[W]e are not at liberty to deny effect to specific provisions .••• "). 
44. See supra note 29. 
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mine Congress's intent with respect to the ambiguous language.4s 
Part II therefore examines the history of the definition of disposal 
to determine whether it can provide any help in resolving this issue. 
!I. THE HISTORY OF THE DISPOSAL DEFINITION 
Ideally, the history of a statute will provide insight into congres-
sional intentions that can inform a court's interpretation of statu-
tory language. The conditions under which Congress passed 
RCRA and CERCLA, however, render their legislative histories 
confusing and contradictory.46 Both CERCLA and RCRA have 
abbreviated and internally inconsistent iegislative histories. 
Although the statutes' histories are tortuous, this Part nevertheless 
concludes that the history of the disposal -definition supports the 
active interpretation. Section II.A traces the compromises reflected 
in CERCLA's liability scheme but concludes that CERCLA's his-
tory does not provide sufficient information to understand what 
Congress intended with respect to the meaning of section 107(a)(2) 
- the provision that imposes liability on prior owners who owned 
the land at the time of disposal. Section II.B examines another leg-
islative source in the development of the disposal definition, 
RCRA, to determine whether the history of that law casts any help-
ful light upon analogous concerns in CERCLA. This Part con~ 
eludes that the evidence from RCRA's history supports an active 
interpretation of diSposal. 
A. Legislative History of CERCLA 
CERCLA's whirlwind passage resulted in an absence of satis-
factory committee reports discussing its liability provisions.47 This 
section therefore seeks other insights into Congress's conception of 
45. See, e.g., Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984) ("Where, as here, resolution of a 
question of federal law turns on a statute and the intention of Congress, we look first to the 
statutory language and then to the legislative history if the statutory language is unclear.")i 
Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1989) ("If the statute is in any 
way ambiguous, then the court must consider the statute's legislative history."). 
46. Congress passed each act in haste at the very end of a congressional session. As a 
result, neither statute's legislative history provides clear guidance as to the meaning of the 
text. See VALERIE M. FOGLEMAN, HAzARnous WA'irrE CLEANUP, LIABILITY, AND LITIGA-
TION - A CoMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO SUPERFUND LAW 5 (1992) (describing the harried 
conditions under which Congress passed CERCLA); William L. Kovacs & John F. Klucsik, 
The New Federal Role in Solid Waste Management: The Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act of 1976, 3 CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 205, 216-20 (1977) (same for RCRA). 
47. See supra note 46. Over 25 senators hammered out the text in a negotiation held 
behind closed doors, and Congress passed CERCLA with little discussion. FOGLEMAN, 
supra note 46, at 12. The House of Representatives considered the bill under a suspension of 
the rules; this device required the House to pass the bill, if at all, without any amendment or 
alteration. Id. at 13. It is unclear why the House imposed a suspension of the rules, although 
the decision may have been motivated by the concern that Senate support for CERCLA had 
evaporated and that any House revision could effectively kill the legislation. See id. (describ-
ing such concerns on the part of Sens. Stafford and Randolph). 
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the causation standard that applies under section 107(a)(2), the pro-
vision that imposes liability on prior landowners, because the stan-
dard of causation that Congress chose to apply could indicate 
whether Congress intended to adopt the active or the passive defi-
nition of disposal. If Congress intended to apply traditional notions 
of proximate and but-for causation to past owners, this intention 
militates in favor of the active defiriition.48 This section offers evi-
dence that several members of Congress did in fact envision such a 
causation requirement but concludes that the statute ultimately re-
mains unclear on this question. 
Some evidence from the floor debate indicates that Congress 
intended to require a showing of causation before liability could 
attach to prior owners. Comments of at least two important CER-
CLA supporters appear to envision a causation requirement. Rep-
resentative James Florio, who introduced H.R. 7020,49 the bill that 
eventually became CERCLA, stated that "a strong liability scheme 
will insure that those responsible for releases of hazardous sub-
stances will be held strictly liable for costs of response and damages 
to natural resources. "50 A desire to attach liability to "those re-
sponsible for releases" would seem to require finding a causal con-
nection between the original pollution and the release and thus 
seems fundamentally inconsistent with the passive definition of dis-
posal. Representative Al Gore - another key CERCLA sup-
porter - also indicated during floor debate that he anticipated a 
strict liability scheme with a causation requirement: "If one cannot 
prove the defendant caused the damage which led to the suit, then 
the strict liability standard is never triggered."51 In addition, at 
least one CERCLA opponent assumed that the statute required a 
showing of causation: "The Government can sue a defendant under 
the bill only for those costs and damages that it can prove were 
caused by the defendant's conduct."52 
Although these individual members of Congress appear to have 
envisioned a traditional causation requirement in CERCLA's liabil-
The resulting debate served only to explain some of the major provisions of CERCLA to 
members of Congress before the final vote. At no point did Congress explain why it adopted 
RCRA's definition of disposa~ nor precisely what it intended by imposing liability upon prior 
landowners. 
48. Under the passive reading of disposa~ prior landowners face liability for the migra-
tion of hazardous waste that they did not create or bury and about which they knew nothing. 
Because such landowners have no causal relationship to the environmental damage, evidence 
that Congress intended for traditional principles of causation to apply would indicate that 
these landowners should not be held liable. Such a result obtains only under the active inter-
pretation of disposal 
49. See Fom.EMAN, supra note 46, at 8. 
50. 126 CoNG. REc. 31,964 (1980) (statement of Rep. Florio) (emphasis added). 
51. 126 CoNG. REc. 26,787 (1980) (statement of Rep. Gore). 
52. 126 CoNG. REc. 30,972 (1980) (statement of Sen. Helms}. 
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ity scheme, Congress's ultimate intentions regarding causation re-
main unclear.53 The statements appear on their face to refer to the 
entire CERCLA statute and would presumably refer to all four cat-
egories of PRPs. Yet, as discussed above, current owners of land 
face strict CERCLA liability without proof of causation.54 It is pos-
sible that the statements referred only to the liability of prior own-
ers, but such a coneiusion is dubious because the statements 
themselves do not seem limited in their application. 
Thus, the ambiguous legislative history of CERCLA does not 
provide a definitive indication of Congress's intent in adopting the 
disposal definition.· Another chapter in the history of the disposal 
definition, however, may prove more illuminating: when O;mgress 
passed RCRA in 1976 and created the disposal definition later im-
ported into CERCLA, it may have intended one or the other mean-
ing of disposal to ~pply. The next section explores this alternative 
source of the disposal definition's history. 
B. Experience Under RCRA 
When defining disposal in CERCLA, Congress adopted by ref-
erence the definition of disposal contained in RCRA.55 Examining 
the use of the word disposal under RCRA may therefore reveal its 
proper meaning under CERCLA.56 The controversy that divides 
courts in applying the disposal definition under CERCLA -
whether Congress intended the disposal definition to include pas-
sive migration - has also arisen under RCRA, albeit in a slightly 
different form. This section first provides a general understanding 
of the role of disposal in the RCRA scheme by examining the sec-
tion of RCRA in which disposal figures most prominently - the 
"imminent hazard" provision. This section then explains the court 
53. At least one court has found that Congress explicitly rejected imposing a causation 
requirement in the liability scheme of CERCLA. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 
F.2d 1032, 1044 {2d Cir. 1985). Although the court in Shore Realty expressly held that the 
causation requirement is absent from all of§ 107(a), its reasoning appears to be limited to 
the category of liability covering present owners: "We agree with the state ... that section 
[107{a){l)] unequivocally imposes strict liability on the current owner .•• without regard to 
causation." 759 F.2d at 1044. The Shore Realty court discounted Senator Helms's remarks 
either as being "a rear guard action" or possibly as referring to the causation defenses pro-
vided in§ 107{b) of the Act. 759 F.2d at 1045 n.19; see 42 U.S.C. § 9607{b) {1988); see also 
Anthony J. Fejfar, Landowner-Lessor Liability Under CERCLA, 53 MD. L. REv. 157, 194 
(1994) {dismissing Sen. Helms's statement). The Shore Realty court rendered its decision in 
1985 and thus did not have the benefit of examining the 1986 amendments to CERCLA, the 
effects of which are considered in Part III. See infra notes 80-86 and accompanying text 
54. See supra note 11. See also Shore Realty, 159 F.2d at 1044 {holding that 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(a){l) does not impose a causation requirement). 
55. See supra note 20. 
56. If, in defining disposa~ the RCRA Congress intended it to include passive migratiqn, 
it seems logical to infer that a subsequent Congress that borrowed the identical wording of 
the definition shared the same intent on this issue. 
622 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 93:609 
decisions defining disposal under RCRA and surveys RCRA's 
structure in an attempt to discover whether Congress intended the 
disposal definition in RCRA to cover passive migration. This sec-
tion concludes that the history of RCRA supports an active inter-
pretation of disposal. 
1. The Disposal Controversy Under RCRA 
Congress enacted RCRA in 1976, four years before CERCLA, 
as a comprehensive solution to the regulation of hazardous waste 
disposal.57 RCRA primarily regulates ongoing disposal of hazard-
ous waste. Eventually, however, the EPA decided to use RCRA to 
seek cleanup of inactive hazardous waste sites as well.58 The EPA 
used as its main weapon section 7003 of RCRA,59 known as the 
"imminent hazard provision": 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, upon receipt of 
evidence that the past or present handling, storage, treatment, trans-
portation or disposal of any solid waste or hazardous waste is present-
ing an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the 
environment, the Administrator may bring suit on behalf of the 
United States ... to immediately restrain any person contributing to 
the alleged disposal to stop such handling, storage, treatment, trans-
portation or disposal or to take such other action as may be 
necessary.60 
The breadth with which one construes the word disposal in this pro-
vision determines the breadth of the EPA's power under RCRA to 
order relief at inactive waste sites. If disposal includes passive mi-
gration, the EPA could use RCRA's imminent hazard provision to 
order the cleanup of long-inactive sites. Put differently, if Congress 
intended for RCRA's imminent hazard provision to apply to inac-
tive waste sites, then Congress must have intended the term dispo-
sal in RCRA to have a passive meaning.61 Given the magnitude of 
57. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 2 {1976), reprinted in 1916 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6239 {"The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 is a mul· 
tifaceted approach toward solving the problems associated with the 3-4 billion tons of dis· 
carded materials generated each year ..•. "); see also Richard deC. Hinds, Liability Under 
Federal Law for Hazardous Waste Injuries, 6 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 15 {1982). 
58. See, e.g., United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv., 496 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Conn. 1980) 
(allowing the EPA to use the imminent hazard provision to mandate intervention at an inac-
tive site). 
59. See J.B. Ruhl, The Plight of the Passive Past Owner, 45 Sw. LJ.1129, 1134-35 (1991) 
("Prior to enactment of CERCLA in 1980, the EPA attempted to force cleanup of several of 
the worst known contaminated sites under RCRA .•.. In the absence of any broad cleanup 
authority such as CERCLA, the EPA relied on the RCRA [imminent hazard) provision with 
limited success to achieve basically the same objective."). 
60. 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (Supp. II 1978) (emphasis added). 
61. Recall that in CERCLA cases, the statute requires cleanup of the hazardous waste 
site; the only issue hinging on the disposal determination is the joint and several liability of 
one party. See supra note 3. By contrast, in RCRA cases the disposal definition determines 
whether an inactive hazardous waste site will receive any attention whatsoever. 
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the problem caused by hazardous waste disposal at abandoned 
sites,62 it should not be surprising that courts attempted to construe 
the disposal definition under RCRA so as to promote liability.63 
The next section, however, demonstrates that Congress did not in-
tend RCRA's imminent hazard provision to cover inactive waste 
sites; therefore, disposal in this provision has an active meaning. 
2. The Meaning of Disposal Under RCRA 
Because RCRA's legislative history provides little insight into 
the intended meaning of disposal, 64 this section considers evidence 
derived both from RCRA's structure and from the actions of subse-
quent Congresses that indicates that Congress only intended for 
RCRA to apply to active waste sites. 
Four elements of RCRA's structure suggest that Congress did 
not intend courts to apply RCRA to inactive waste sites. First, 
Congress cast the language of the imminent hazard provision in the 
62. See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120 (referring to "a major new source of environmental concern ... : 
the tragic consequences of improper[ ], negligent[ ], and reckless[] hazardous waste disposal 
practices known as the 'inactive hazardous waste site problem'"); H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra 
note 57, at 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6239 (referring to "the problems associated 
with the 3-4 billion tons of discarded materials generated each year"). 
63. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.NJ. 1981), affd., 688 F.2d 204 
{3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv., 496 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Conn. 1980). 
The desire of the courts to expand liability to implicate all possible defendants emerges with 
particular clarity in United States v. Waste Industries, Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 165 {4th Cir. 1984) 
("Limiting the government's enforcement prerogatives to cases involving active human con-
duct would open a gaping hole in the overall protection of the environment envisioned by 
Congress, a protection designed to be responsive to unpredictable circumstances."). Ulti-
mately, of course, Congress addressed the concerns of these courts when it passed CERCLA 
in 1980. 
Another factor that may explain courts' expansive interpretation of the imminent hazard 
provision i~ that in some cases the owner of the land at the time liability attached also had 
been the entity responsible for contaminating the land. See, e.g., Solvents Recovery, 496 F. 
Supp. at 1130-31. Thus, a RCRA imminent hazard provision defendant may have differed 
significantly from the typical CERCLA § 107{a)(2) defendant in that the latter was much 
more likely to be "innocent." Innocent here means only that the defendant was not a pol-
luter and did not know about the environmental contamination; this should not be confused 
with the somewhat more stringent definition incorporated in the' "innocent landowner de-
fense" discussed infra at notes 80-86 and accompanying text. 
64. Like CERCLA, RCRA presents an elusive subject upon which to perform a mean-
ingful legislative history analysis. Congress passed the Act during the final days of a congres-
sional session. See Kovacs & Klucsik, supra note 46, at 219-20. The final version of the 
RCRA bill resulted from an informal House-Senate compromise and did not receive the 
benefit of a conference committee. See id. at 219. The House of Representatives, in a last-
minute vote, passed the compromise legislation without a single member having read the 
final version. See id. at 220. 
As a result of this hasty and tumultuous passage, RCRA possesses little meaningful legis-
lative history. In fact, the legislative history of the original Act contains no specific discussion 
of the scope of the imminent hazard provision and no mention of the reasons underlying its 
insertion. See Waste Indus., 734 F.2d at 165. RCRA's overall structure, however, does pro-
vide help in interpreting the definition of disposal. 
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present tense. 6s The language of the provision - "the Administra-
tor may bring suit on behalf of the United States ... to immediately 
restrain any person contributing to the alleged disposal"66 - ap-
plied on its face solely to currently occurring activity. No potential 
defendant could be currently "contributing to" an inactive waste 
site. It therefore seems unlikely that Congress intended the provi-
sion to apply to inactive sites. 
Second, the location of the imminent hazard provision within 
the Act also indicates that Congress did not intend for the Act to 
apply to inactive sites.67 The provision appears in a portion of the 
Act entitled "Miscellaneous Provisions." The substantive require-
ments of the Act are located elsewhere. Had Congress intended for 
the provision to have the broad scope assigned to it by the EPA and 
some courts, it likely would have placed the provision within the 
parts of the Act that establish substantive requirements and provide 
for criminal and civil penalties.68 
Third, the fact that the imminent hazard provision immediately 
follows the citizen suit provision has led at least one court to con-
clude that Congress intended the imminent hazard provision to be 
predominantly jurisdictional in nature, providing an otherwise un-
available federal forum to cover emergency situations.69 
Finally, Congress did not draft the language of the imminent 
hazard provision especially for RCRA; similar provisions appear in 
other environmental statutes.70 It seems highly unlikely that Con-
gress would have used this kind of boilerplate language to enact 
such an important substantive legal change - that is, allowing the 
EPA to address inactive waste sites. 
In addition to these structural considerations, there exists some 
additional evidence of Congress's view of the scope of the imminent 
hazard provision. In the course of amending RCRA in 1980, the 
65. Several courts have commented on the importance of the tense in which the immi-
nent hazard provision was drafted. See, e.g., United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 556 F. Supp. 
1301, 1307 (E.D.N.C. 1982), revd., 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Price, 523 F. 
Supp. 1055, 1070 (D.NJ. 1981}, affd., 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982). 
66. 42 U.S.C. § 6973(Supp.II1978} (emphasis added}. Congress amended this provision 
in 1984 to recast it in both present and past tense. See Hazardous and Solid Waste Amend-
ments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, § 402, 98 Stat. 3221, 3271. This subsequent change, 
however, does not reflect either the intent of the RCRA Congress or the intent of the Con-
gress that incorporated RCRA's understanding of disposal into CERCLA in 1980. 
67. See, e.g., United States v. Midwest Solvent Recovery, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 138, 143-44 
(N.D. Ind. 1980) (inferring that the imminent hazard provision is jurisdictional in nature be-
cause of its location with miscellaneous provisions rather than with standard-creating sub-
stantive provisions and because it is located next to a provision conferring standing). 
68. For examples of these sections, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922-6925 (1988). For a fuller ver-
sion of this argument, see Midwest Solvent Recovery, 484 F. Supp. at 144. 
69. See 484 F. Supp. at 143-44. 
70. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 504, 33 U.S.C. § 1364 (1988); Safe Drinking Water Act 
§ 1431, 42 U.S.C. § 300i(a) (1988). 
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Senate Environment and Public Works Committee explained the 
scope of the imminent hazard provision by announcing that it incor-
porated common law standards of liability.71 Although the report 
in fact indicates that the committee intended the liability standard 
with respect to persons contributing to disposal to be broader than 
at common law,12 the example the report gives still contemplates 
that such persons "had knowledge of the illicit disposal or failed to 
exercise due care in selecting or instructing the entity actually con-
ducting the disposal."73 This language is more consistent with an 
active definition of disposal than with a passive definition, because 
it envisions landowners who have actual knowledge of the disposal 
or fail to exercise care with respect to the entity actually conducting 
the disposal. Those who own the land while toxic waste migrates 
unbeknownst to them by definition do not have such knowledge 
and cannot fail to act with care with respect to the conduct of a 
disposal about which they know nothing. 
The final evidence of Congress's intent in fashioning RCRA's 
imminent hazard provision may be found in the legislative history 
of CERCLA. A report accompanying the bill that eventually be-
came CERCLA examined the need for new law in the area of inac-
tive waste sites: "Since enactment of [RCRA], a major new source 
of environmental concern has surfaced: the tragic consequences of 
improper[], negligent[], and reckless[ ] hazardous waste disposal 
practices known as the 'inactive hazardous waste site problem.' ... 
Existing law is clearly inadequate to deal with this massive 
problem."74 
This report suggests that Congress did not intend RCRA's im-
minent hazard provision to address the problems posed by inactive 
waste sites. If the provision could be used to order the cleanup of 
abandoned or inactive sites, RCRA itself would not be "inadequate 
to deal with this massive problem."75 That is, if the definition of 
71. S. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5019, 
5023. The Supreme Court has observed that "particularly ... when the precise intent of the 
enacting Congress is obscure," the views of subsequent Congresses "are entitled to significant 
weight." Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980); see also Bell 
v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 784 (1983) ("Of course, the view of a later Congress does not 
establish definitively the meaning of an earlier enactment, but it does have persuasive 
value."). 
72. S. REP. No. 172, supra note 71, at 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5023. 
73. Id. In addition, the fact that Congress envisioned disposal as the type of activity that 
an "entity" would need to "conduct[]" also indicates that Congress intended the active read-
ing of disposal to apply. 
74. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 17-18 (1980), reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120. In the course of the debate over CERCLA, individual members of 
Congress made statements along similar lines. See, e.g., 126 CoNG. REc. 30,931 (1980) (state-
ment of Sen. Randolph) ("[T]here is no procedure for dealing with dangers posed by ... past 
disposal of chemical wastes."). 
75. H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 74, at 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6120. 
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disposal included passive migration, RCRA's imminent hazard pro-
vision would indeed be adequate to cover inactive sites. Thus, the 
enactment of CERCLA itself provides the strongest argument that 
Congress did not understand the word disposal in RCRA to include 
passive migration.76 
The history and structure of the disposal definition thus indicate 
that Congress intended for an active definition of disposal to apply. 
Originally, Congress employed the disposal definition in RCRA to 
allow the EPA to address instances of ongoing contamination at ac-
tive waste sites. Congress then placed an identical definition in 
CERCLA. Although CERCLA's messy history does not provide 
much new information, it seems logical that Congress would expect 
identical language to have the same meaning in CERCLA that it 
did in RCRA. 
III. THE STRUCTURE OF CERCLA 
This Part argues that the structure of CERCLA supports the 
active reading of disposal. 77 Section III.A examines uses of the 
term disposal in the statute outside section 107(a)(2) and concludes 
that these. other references support the active interpretation. Sec-
tion III.B analyzes the role of section 107(a)(2) within CERCLA's 
general liability scheme and concludes that the contextual relation-
ship between the categories of PRP liability embodied in sections 
107(a)(l) and 107(a)(2) confirms Congress's intention to employ 
the active reading of disposal. Finally, section III.C explores the 
76. The fact that Congress considered RCRA inadequate and created CERCLA to rem-
edy the problem of inactive waste sites could imply that Congress intended the disposal defi-
nition in CERCLA to have a broader scope than it did in RCRA. Upon closer analysis, 
however, this theory must fail. Had Congress intended disposal to possess a broader mean-
ing under CERCLA than under RCRA, it would not likely have incorporated the same defi-
nition without any clarifying statement. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. One 
might also argue that Congress intended to codify a broad interpretation of disposal already 
reached by courts when Congress selected the same text for CERCLA. Most of the cases 
adopting the passive interpretation of disposal under RCRA, however, were decided after 
Congress passed CERCLA. See, e.g., United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159 (4th 
Cir. 1984); United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.NJ. 1981); United States v. Midwest 
Solvent Recovery, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Ind. 1980). 
77. Looking to the structure and purpose of statutes as a whole enables courts faced with 
ambiguous provisions to adopt interpretations with the greatest fidelity to the congressional 
intent underlying the statute. For the general proposition that courts should analyze statutes 
by examining the statute as a whole, see Helvering v. New York 'Ihlst Co., 292 U.S. 455, 464 
(1934). See also United Sav. Assn. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 
(1988) ("A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remain-
der of the statutory scheme - because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context 
that makes its meaning clear or because only one of the permissible meanings produces a 
substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law." (citations omitted}); Kenneth 
W. Starr, Of Forests and Trees: Structuralism in the Interpretation of Statutes, 56 GEo. WASH, 
L. REv. 703, 706 (1988) ("[S]tatutes are to be studied carefully, as a whole, and with due 
regard for the structure of the statutory edifice and the interpretive lessons to be drawn from 
that edifice."). 
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significance of the "guilty prior landowner" provision and infers 
from it that Congress assumed that the active reading of disposal 
would apply, because only this reading avoids bizarre results. 
A. CERCLA's Other Uses of Disposal 
The word disposal, or a close variation thereof, occurs eight 
times in CERCLA other than in section 107(a)(2).78 In each case, 
when using the word disposal, the statute clearly contemplates an 
environmental polluter taking active steps to rid itself of contami-
nated material.79 · 
1. Use of the Word Disposal in the Innocent Landowner Defense 
In 1986, Congress extended the duration of CERCLA by enact-
ing the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act 
(SARA).80 As part of the SARA amendments, Congress modified 
the CERCLA liability scheme by providing narrow exemptions for 
certain classes of persons otherwise liable. One such exemption re-
flects Congress's desire to free from liability those "innocent" cur-
rent owners of land who did not produce any waste and who, in 
good faith, had no knowledge that a previous landowner had buried 
waste on the land.81 Congress accomplished this exemption by first 
defining the class of transactions in land that would result in liabil-
ity and then creating an exception for innocent purchasers. This 
"innocent landowner exemption," which appears in a modification 
to the definitional section of CERCLA, provides that purchasers 
are liable for the land they acquire unless they can show, inter alia, 
that "the real property on which the facility concerned is located 
was acquired by the defendant after the disposal or placement of 
the hazardous substance on, in, or at the facility."82 
Congress clearly intended the above provision to exempt from 
liability purchasers who acquired the land after the relevant pollut-
ing activity had taken place. Congress expressed this intention, 
78. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(9)(B), 9601(22), 9601(23), 9601(35)(A), 9603(c), 9607(a)(3), 
9607(a)(4), 9622(g)(l)(B)(ii) (1988). 
79. For an example of a court conducting this type of analysis on CERCLA's use of 
disposal, see United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1351 (N.D. Ill. 
1992). 
80. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988)). 
Although the legislative history of SARA does not approach the chaos of the legislative 
histories of CERCLA and RCRA, it is still far from a model of clarity. See FOGLEMAN, 
supra note 46, at 13-20. 
81. See, e.g., 131 CoNG. REc. 34,715-17 (1985) (discussing both innocent landowner and 
innocent purchaser exceptions). 
82. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1988). Section 101(35) of CERCLA defines contractual re-
lationship as including, but not being limited to, "land contracts, deeds or other instruments 
transferring title or possession" with the exception quoted in the text. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) 
(1988). 
628 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 93:609 
however, by requiring that the exemption apply only to innocent 
purchasers who receive the land after "disposal" of the hazardous 
waste. If disposal incorporates passive migration, virtually no one 
could qualify for this defense because the passive migration could 
well occur or continue to occur dufing the innocent purchaser's 
ownership. As one court has noted, only purchasers fortunate 
enough to purchase land where the buried waste was contained in 
concrete - and thus incapable of migration - could assert the de-
fense if courts adopted the passive definition of disposal. 83 
By referring in these amendments to a period of time "after the 
disposal or placement of the hazardous substance,"84 Congress clar-
ified two issues. First, Congress envisioned disposal as a discrete 
act, with distinct beginning and ending points. Construing disposal 
to incorporate passive migration would eliminate any period of 
time "after the disposal."85 Second, Congress appears to have 
viewed the process of disposal as being akin to the concept of place-
ment, 86 which requires an affirmative act, further suggesting that 
Congress envisioned disposal as requiring active conduct. 
2. Use of the Word Disposal in the De Minimis Settlement 
Provision 
Section 122 of CERCLA, also added as part of the SARA 
amendments, provides the EPA with authority to enter into an ex-
pedited settlement with PRPs who do not figure prominently in the 
contamination of inactive hazardous waste sites. 87 A PRP's contri-
bution to the contamination of the site may be considered de 
minimis in two different cases. Either the PRP has contributed a 
quantity of waste that, in physical amount and adverse environmen-
tal effect, is "minimal in comparison to other hazardous substances 
83. See Petersen Sand & Gravel, 806 F. Supp. at 1352. 
84. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1988). 
85. This argument would fail, of course, if periods of passive migration also had distinct 
beginning and ending points. Although one could probably identify the beginning point of 
passive migration with reasonable certainty, the movement of the hazardous waste tends to 
continue in such a way as to render the identification of an ending point all but impossible. 
See Petersen Sand & Gravel, 806 F. Supp. at 1352 (noting that because passive migration is 
constant, only prior owners lucky enough to have the waste on their land enclosed in con-
crete could escape liability under the passive reading of disposal); Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. 
James & Co., 836 F. Supp. 1264, 1270 (W.D. La. 1993) (acknowledging that rainfall causes 
passive migration of hazardous materials on a near-constant basis, but declining to attach 
§ 107(a)(2) liability on that fact alone). 
86. Although Congress used the disjunctive in linking the words placement and disposal, 
reference to the disposal definition reveals that Congress intended for placement to be a 
subsidiary component of disposal Congress defined disposal as "the discharge, deposit, in· 
jection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste." 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1988) 
(emphasis added). 
87. 42 u.s.c. § 9622(g)(l) (1988). 
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at the facility,"88 or the PRP is a present owner who "did not con-
duct or permit the generation, transportation, storage, treatment, or 
disposal" of the hazardous waste and who "did not contribute to 
the release ... through any action or omission."89 The provision 
thus provides a route to quick settlements for very minor polluters 
and for certain landowners who are otherwise faultless but cannot 
satisfy the innocent landowner defense. A later portion of this sec-
tion confirms that the settlement provision targets innocent present 
landowners: PRPs are not eligible for expedited settlements under 
the statute if they "purchased the real property with actual or con-
structive knowledge that the property was used for the generation, 
transportation, storage, treatment, or disposal of any hazardous 
substance."90 
The structure of the de minimis settlement provision supports 
an active reading of disposal.91 Congress explicitly limits the inno-
cent landowner eligibility for expedited settlement to present own-
ers of contaminated land. If prior landowners faced liability for 
passive migration under section· 107(a)(2), this limitation would 
seem bizarre; no principled ground exists for allowing innocent 
present landowners to settle their liability cheaply and quickly 
while denying this benefit to innocent prior landowners. Thus, the 
fact that Congress limited that part of the statute to innocent pres-
ent owners strongly suggests that Congress did not intend for inno-
cent prior owners to be PRPs at all.92 
3. Use of the Word Disposal in the Definition of Facility 
The statute's definition of a "facility" that may require cleanup 
pursuant to CERCLA includes "any site or area where a hazardous 
substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed."93 
The inclusion of disposed of in this list of verbs indicates that Con-
gress envisioned disposal as requiring an actor. The words sur-
rounding disposed of - deposited, stored, and placed - all require 
an actor. If courts interpret disposal in such a way as to make it 
harmonize with its surrounding language, as the principle of nos-
citur a sociis dictates,94 then courts should construe disposal to re-
88. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(l)(A) (1988). 
89. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(l)(B) (1988) (emphasis added). 
90. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(l)(B) (1988) (emphasis added). 
91. See Ruhl, supra note 59, at 1143-44. In addition, the grouping of disposal with the 
words generation, transportation, storage, and treatment supports the active definition to the 
extent that the words obviously all share active characteristics. 
92. See infra text accompanying notes 116-22 (arguing that Congress never intended to 
make innocent prior owners PRPs). 
93. 42 u.s.c. § 9601(9)(B) (1988). 
94. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
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quire the same affirmative conduct required by depositing, storing, 
and placing. 
4. Use of the Word Disposal in the Definition of Removal 
Disposal appears in CERCLA a fourth time when Congress de-
fined removal by listing a series of acts, including "the disposal of 
removed material."95 The definition of removal explicitly labels a 
disposal as a type of "action[ ]."96 The act or action of disposal re-
quires an actor to do the disposing; a definition of disposal that en-
compasses passive migration, which occurs even without an actor, 
seems inconsistent with such a provision. 
5. Use of the Word Disposal in CERCLA 's Generator PRP 
Category 
The third category of PRPs on whom CERCLA imposes liabil-
ity includes "any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise 
arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter 
for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances 
owned or possessed by such person. "97 Conceiving of disposal as 
the type of activity for which one would need to "arrange[]" clearly 
implies an active definition of disposal. 
6. Use of the Word Disposal in CERCLA's Transporter PRP 
Category 
The fourth category of PRPs on whom CERCLA imposes liabil-
ity includes "any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous 
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities."98 This 
section, which envisions facilities at which hazardous waste is either 
recycled - through "treatment" - or eliminated - through "dis-
posal" - presupposes an actor at the facility to perform the desired 
task. It thus appears to support the active reading of disposal. 
95. The statute defines removal, in part, as: 
the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the environment, ... such 
actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of 
release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material, or the taking of such 
other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public 
health or welfare or to the environment, which may otherwise result from a release or 
threat of release. 
42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1988) (emphasis added). 
96. 42 u.s.c. § 9601(23) (1988). 
97. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1988) (emphasis added). 
98. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988) (emphasis added). 
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7. Use of the Word Disposal in CERCLA's Notification 
Requirement 
631 
Section 103(c) of CERCLA requires PRPs to notify the EPA of 
the existence of "a facility at which hazardous substances ... are or 
have been stored, treated, or disposed of."99 As with the definition 
of facility itself, 100 in order to construe disposed of consistently with 
its surrounding words - stored and treated - one must interpret 
the term to require an affirmative act. 
8. Use of the Word Disposal in the Definition of Release 
The eighth instance of the word disposal in CERCLA occurs in 
the statute's definition of release. Release forms a critical part of 
CERCLA's liability scheme; the statute imposes liability on the 
four categories of PRPs only for damages resulting from a release 
or threat of release.101 CERCLA defines release as follows: 
The term "release" means any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, 
emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dump-
ing, or disposing into the environment (including the abandonment or 
discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles contain-
ing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant).102 
The above definition contains several significant features. Some 
words in the above list truly admit of no active component.103 For 
instance, leaching and escaping require no affirmative conduct; 
these are intransitive verbs. The fact that the definition of release 
contains words with active meanings and words with passive mean-
ings, combined with the fact that one of the words is disposing, 
leads to a second conclusion: Congress intended release to have a 
broader meaning than disposaf.104 
The contrast between the language used in the two definitions is 
quite revealing. Release, a broader concept than disposal, clearly 
includes both active and passive components. The language of the 
disposal definition, on the other hand, appears ambiguous on this 
point. If release is broader than disposal, and release already in-
99. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(c) (1988). 
100. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. 
101. PRPs face liability for, inter alia, "damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of 
natural resources, including tbe reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss 
resulting from such a release." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (1988). 
102. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) {1988) (emphasis added}. The definition continues by exclud-
ing certain occurrences, none of which are relevant to the present discussion. 
103. Although some courts make a similar claim for tbe words in the disposal definitional 
list, see, e.g., Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845 {4th Cir.}, cert. 
denied, 113 S. Ct. 377 (1992), the words leak and spill are ambiguous in that they possess 
alternative meanings with active components. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text. 
104. See, e.g., United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1351 n.2 
(N.D. Ill. 1992) ("What is clear is that 'release' was meant to be more inclusive than 
'disposal.' "). ' 
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eludes explicitly passive components, it makes sense to conclude 
that disposal is limited to its active meaning. Interpreting disposal 
to include passive migration collapses the disposal definition into 
the release definition, for if one were to impute passive components 
into the disposal definition, disposal and release would become op-
erationally interchangeable; no meaningful difference would exist 
between the two terms. This result, however, makes little sense, for 
Congress would not have created a separate definition for disposal 
if it intended for that word to mean the same thing as release. 10s 
The use of the words into the environment in the release defini-
tion further reveals its broad scope. Recall that Congress selected 
different language - "so that such solid waste or hazardous waste 
or any constituent thereof may enter the environment"106 - in de-
fining disposal. 107 Once a landowner has filled tanks with hazard-
ous waste, the material has not entered the environment, but the 
potential for contamination exists.1os A release - not another dis-
posal - occurs when a rupture in the tank causes the hazardous 
material passively to migrate "into the environment." In fact, this 
language refers so clearly to passive migration that Congress added 
an explanatory phrase - "including the abandonment or discard-
ing of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing 
any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant"109 - to 
make clear that release also included the smaller and distinct co·n-
cept of disposal. 
The contextual difference between release and disposal thus elu-
cidates Congress's intent in drafting section 107(a)(2) of CERCLA. 
Had Congress desired to include passive migration as part of this 
section of the liability scheme, it would have held previous owners 
liable if they owned the land at the time of any release. Congress 
declined this approach, deciding instead to limit prior owner liabil-
ity to ownership at the time of disposal. At least one court has held 
the difference in these definitions sufficient reason to adopt the ac-
tive interpretation of disposa1.110 
105. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing the principle that statutes must 
be construed so as to give every word meaning). 
106. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1988) (emphasis added). 
107. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text. 
108. Another way of phrasing this conclusion is to say that the polluter created the risk of 
eventual environmental contamination, or the threat of release. For an example of a court 
exploring the importance of the "so that such solid waste ... may enter the environment" 
language, see United States v. Waste Industries, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 1301, 1306 (E.D.N.C. 
1982), revd., 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984). 
109. 42 u.s.c. § 9601(22) (1988). 
110. See United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1351 (N.D. Ill. 
1992). The Petersen court also relies heavily on the "innocent landowner" argument. See 
supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text. 
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B. The Contextual Difference Between Present and Prior Owners 
The difference between CERCLA's separate liability categories 
for present and prior owners111 also demonstrates that Congress in-
tended for the active definition of disposal to apply. Section 
107(a)(1) imposes liability on any current owner of contaminated 
land.112 Adopting a definition of disposal in section 107(a)(2) that 
includes passive migration would also impose liability upon every-
one who owned the land since the original pollution, because pas-
sive migration would make disposal a near-continuous process.113 
Although one may question whether Congress intended to treat 
previous owners differently from present owners,114 it seems rea-
sonable - relying on a structural reading of CERCLA - to infer 
that if Congress created two separate categories for liability, it must 
have intended to reach two separate classes of defendants.115 Own-
ership alone triggers 107(a)(1) liability; something more must be 
required - for example, the temporal element of owning the land 
during a disposal - to trigger 107(a)(2) liability. Interpreting 
107(a)(2) such that all post-pollution owners face liability tends to 
collapse the two categories of PRPs. Had Congress intended this 
result, it probably would have said so directly rather than relying on 
a tortuous construction of disposa1.116 
111. Recall that§ 107(a)(l) renders liable "the owner and operator of a vessel or a facil-
ity ... from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of 
response costs." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l) (1988). Section 107(a)(2) establishes liability for 
"any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any 
facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988). 
In other words, § 107(a)(l) covers present owners and § 107(a)(2) applies to previous 
owners. 
112. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985). The 
imposition of liability, of course, remains subject to the causation-based defenses, codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988) and discussed supra at note 11. 
113. See, e.g., Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 836 F. Supp. 1264, 1270 (W.D. La. 
1993) ("This court does not agree with [plaintiff's] contention that § 9607(a)(2) liability 
should be extended to all prior owners solely on the basis that rainfall obviously causes haz-
ardous materials to leach through the soil."). 
114. See, e.g., Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845-46 (4th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 377 (1992). 
115. See, e.g., Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572 
(5th Cir. 1988) (using a structural reading of CERCLA's liability provisions to differentiate 
between § 107(a)(l) and § 107(a)(2)); Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1044 (same). 
116. Several courts adopting the active interpretation of disposal have commented on this 
fact. See, e.g., Snediker Developers v. Evans, 773 F. Supp. 984, 989 (E.D. Mich. 1991) 
("[A]ssuming that any hazardous waste may migrate long after it has been introduced into 
the environment, [the passive reading's] sweeping interpretation of the term disposal would 
effectively impose cleanup liability on any owner in a chain of title. The Court is satisfied 
that if the drafters of CERCLA had intended such a far reaching consequence, they would 
have said so explicitly."); Ecodyne Corp. v. Shah, 718 F. Supp. 1454, 1457 (N.D. Cal. 1989) 
("To define disposal as plaintiff wishes would effectively make all property owners from the 
time a site became polluted (up to and including the current owner) potentially liable under 
§ 9607(a)(2) even if these owners did not introduce the chemicals onto the site. Such a con-
struction conflicts with the limited scope of§ 9607(a)(2)."). 
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C. The Implications of the Guilty Prior Landowner Provision 
Buried amidst the definitions incorporated into CERCLA as 
part of the 1986 SARA amendments lurks one of the most substan-
tive, liability-generating provisions of the entire statute. Section 
101(35) defines the phrase contractual relationship117 for purposes 
of section 107(b )(3), which provides that a third-party defense is 
not available if the third party's "act or omission occurs in connec-
tion with a contractual relationship ... with the defendant."118 Sec-
tion 101(35), however, also modifies the meaning of contractual 
relationship so that innocent landowners escape liability.119 Section 
101(35)(C) clarifies the scope of the innocent landowner defense. 
It provides: 
Nothing in this paragraph or in section 9607(b)(3) [the causation-
based defense section] of this title shall diminish the liability of any 
previous owner or operator of such facility who would otherwise be 
liable under this chapter. Notwithstanding this paragraph, if the de-
fendant obtained actual knowledge of the release or threatened re-
lease of a hazardous substance at such facility when the defendant 
owned the real property and then subsequently transferred ownership 
of the property to another person without disclosing such knowledge, 
such defendant shall be treated as liable under section 9607(a)(1) of 
this title and no [causation-based defense] shall be available to such 
defendant.120 
This "guilty landowner provision" confirms the active definition 
of disposal because the provision makes no sense if it were to coex-
ist with the passive definition. The passive reading of disposal is 
inconsistent with the provision in two separate ways. First, it would 
imply that Congress intended innocent present owners to be treated 
much better than innocent prior owners under CERCLA. Second, 
it would imply that Congress chose arbitrarily to move PRPs al-
ready liable under one category to a different category when such a 
change would have absolutely no effect. 
The initial sentence of the provision clarifies that the innocent 
landowner defense protects only present owners; prior owners are 
not eligible. If Congress intended to adopt the passive reading of 
disposal, tP,en almost all owners after the original pollution would 
become liable as a consequence of passive migration on their 
117. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1988). 
118. 42 u.s.c. § 9607(b)(3) (1988). 
119. Recall that the innocent landowner defense actually appears in the definitional sec-
tion, by exempting certain transactions from the phrase contractual relationship. See supra 
note 82 and accompanying text. Section 101(35)(A) establishes the elements of this innocent 
landowner defense. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1988). Section 101(35)(B) establishes the due 
diligence standard with which innocent landowners must comply before gaining eligibility for 
the defense. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (1988). 
120. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C) (1988). 
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land.121 Some of these owners undoubtedly would "not know" or 
would have "no reason to know" about the migration, which would 
qualify them for the innocent landowner defense if they were pres· 
ent owners. As prior owners, however, they would receive no pro· 
tection from the innocent landowner provision because it 
specifically restricts its effect to present owners. Thus, innocent 
present owners would fare much better under CERCLA than 
seemingly innocent prior owners for no apparent reason. The most 
likely explanation for the fact that Congress excluded innocent 
prior owners from the scope of the innocent landowner defense is 
that Congress never intended to make innocent prior owners PRPs 
at an.122 
Adoption of the passive reading of disposal would also imply 
that Congress wanted to reassign PRPs from one liability category 
to another. The guilty prior landowner provision assigns liability 
under section 107(a)(1) to prior landowners who gain actual knowl· 
edge of the contamination. The effects such a provision would have 
if Congress intended the passive definition of disposal to apply are 
anomalous. Recall that under the passive reading most prior own-
ers in the chain of title after the initial contamination would face 
liability under section 107(a)(2) by virtue of the continuous nature 
of hazardous waste migration.123 The effect of the provision, then, 
would be to take guilty prior landowners already liable under sec-
tion 107(a)(2) and to make them liable instead under section 
107(a)(1). This explicit reassignment of liability would constitute 
nothing but meaningless surplusage - PRPs liable under section 
107(a)(1) do not face consequences any different from those liable 
under section 107(a)(2) - and would seem bizarre. Certainly the 
statute should be interpreted in a way that avoids this result;124 only 
adoption of the active reading of disposal accomplishes this end. · 
IV. THE PURPOSES OF CERCLA 
This Part examines Congress's purposes in enacting CERCLA 
and concludes that use of the active reading of disposal is consistent 
with those purposes.125 Congress enacted CERCLA with two goals 
121. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
122. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 91-92 (reaching a similar conclusion with respect 
to the de minimis settlement provision). 
123. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
124. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
125. In construing a statute to give full effect to the intent of the legislature, courts may 
look to the purpose of the statutory scheme. See, e.g., United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 
337-38 (1950) ("The history of [the] statute, its original purpose, and its present status are all 
relevant considerations in its interpretation."). If at all possible, the reviewing court should 
give effect to the purpose of the statute. See, e.g., Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 
377, 386 (1948) (" 'Words ... are to be construed if reasonably possible to effectuate the 
intent of the lawmakers; and this meaning •.. is to be arrived at not only by a consideration 
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in mind - to enable the government to clean up inactive hazardous 
waste sites and to make polluters bear the cost of cleanup.126 Sec-
tion IV.A argues that the cleanup goal does not mandate adoption 
of the passive definition of disposal. Section IV.B contends, on the 
other hand, that the goal of imposing costs on polluters strongly 
supports the active definition. 
A. Enabling Government Cleanup of Hazardous Waste Sites 
The primary purpose of CERCLA is to enable the government 
to clean up abandoned or inactive hazardous waste sites.127 
Although many courts rely on this goal to construe liability under 
CERCLA broadly and exceptions narrowly - on the apparent the-
ory that the more entities liable under CERCLA, the better 
equipped the Superfund will be to deal with hazardous waste 
sites128 - this purpose should not be stretched to impose liability 
beyond the limits in the statutory scheme.129 Judge Easterbrook, 
writing for a Seventh Circuit panel, has forcefully addressed this 
issue: 
When the liability may be large - it is costly to clean up polluted 
sites - there is a chance that one or more of the firms that have 
caused the problem will not have the assets necessary to set things 
of the words themselves, but by considering, as well, the context, the purposes of the law, and 
the circumstances under which the words were employed.'" (quoting Puerto Rico v. Shell 
Co., 302 U.S. 253, 258 (1937))). 
126. See, e.g., Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1247 {6th Cir. 1991) 
("(CERCLA's] two essential purposes have been identified. First, Congress intended to pro· 
vide the federal government with the tools ... for a swift and effective response to hazardous 
waste sites. Second, Congress intended that those responsible for disposal of chemical poi-
sons bear the cost and responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they created." 
(citations omitted)); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 
1081 {1st Cir. 1986); Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283, 1288 (D.R.I. 1986). Commentators 
have underscored these two purposes of CERCLA: 
CERCLA has two major purposes: the primary one is to enable the federal government 
to swiftly clean up abandoned and uncontrolled hazardous waste sites. CERCLA's sec-
ondary purpose is to make persons who were responsible for the improper disposal of 
hazardous waste bear the cost and responsibility of cleaning it up. 
FOGLEMAN, supra note 46, at 1 {footnotes omitted); see also, e.g., Dennis J. Byrne, Jones-
Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials: Chemical Supplier "Arranges" for CERCLA Liability, 23 
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 213, 220 {1993) ("Courts applying CERCLA have cited two pri-
mary legislative purposes underlying the Act: to give governmental agencies the tools for 
prompt and effective responses to such problems and to force those responsible for creating 
the pollution to bear the costs of remedying the contamination.") (emphasis added). 
127. See, e.g., Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 (6th Cir. 1985) ("[CER· 
CLA] was designed primarily to facilitate the prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites ...• "); 
see also Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 1386-87 (5th Cir. 1989) 
(quoting Walls); Dickerson v. EPA, 834 F.2d 974, 978 {11th Cir. 1987) (same); J.V. Peters & 
Co. v. EPA, 767 F.2d 263, 264 {6th Cir. 1985) (same). 
128. Many courts have taken this approach. For one example, see New York v. Shore 
Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 {2d Cir. 1985). 
129. See Ecodyne Corp. v. Shah, 718 F. Supp. 1454, 1457 {N.D. Cal. 1989) {"However 
broad Congress may have intended the definition, Congressional intent does not justify the 
distortion [of] the statute."). 
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right. The prospect of a shortfall in assets means that someone else 
(the public at large) must incur cleanup costs; victims may be left to 
bear their own losses . . . . The designation of additional firms as 
responsible ameliorates this problem and so helps to achieve statutory 
aims .... 
It is not our function to design rules of liability from the gtound 
up, however. We are enforcing a statute rather than modifying rules 
of common law .... To the point that courts could achieve "more" of 
the legislative objectives by adding to the lists of those responsible, it 
is enough to respond that statutes have not only ends but also limits. 
Born of compromise, laws such as CERCLA and SARA do not pur-
sue their ends to their logical limits. A court's job is to find and en-
force stopping points no less than to implement other legislative 
choices.130 
The first three Parts of this Note demonstrate that CERCLA con-
tains such a "stopping point" in its definition of disposal. These 
Parts show that Congress intended disposal to have an active mean-
ing, thereby limiting the liability of prior landowners to those whose 
affirmative actions contributed to the spread of hazardous waste. 
In interpreting CERCLA, then, courts should not use broad, gener-
alized goals, such as achieving maximal funds for cleanup, to ignore 
the limits inherent in the most plausible reading of the statute. 
B. Imposing Cleanup Costs on Polluters 
CERCLA's secondary purpose - assuring that polluters bear 
the costs of cleanup - also bears directly on the controversy over 
the disposal definition. Construing disposal to include passive mi-
gration would spread the costs of cleanup to prior property owners 
whose only sin consisted of owning land with leaky storage tanks 
buried underneath, though they were quite ignorant of that fact. 
The active reading of disposal ensures that liability under section 
107(a)(2) rests squarely where it belongs: on the environmental 
polluters who created the risk that hazardous waste would enter the 
environment and who received the economic benefits of doing so, 
and on those who discovered the contamination but refused to take 
action to remedy the problem. 
This equity argument may appear at first blush to overlook the 
fact that current landowners clearly face liability without any de-
gree of fault under section 107(a)(1).131 Nevertheless, CERCLA's 
statutory scheme explicitly differentiates between present and prior 
owners: prior owners face liability under section 107(a)(2) only if 
they owned the land "at the time of disposal."132 The disposal Ian-
130. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 157 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(citation omitted). 
131. 42 U.S.C. § 9607{a){l) (1988). 
132. 42 U.S.C. § 9607{a){2) {1988). 
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guage thus serves to qualify the liability imposed on prior owners 
and to differentiate the legal standards for the two separate classes 
of liability. As the Second Circuit has explained, "Congress in-
tended to cover different classes of people differently •... [S]ection 
[107(a)(2)]'s scope is more limited than that of section 
[107(a)(1)]."133 Bound by the plain terms of CERCLA, courts must 
impose liability upon current owners. Courts should not, however, 
use the fact that Congress intended to apply very broad liability to 
present owners in order to impose equally proad liability upon the 
class of prior owners whose liability Congress expressly qualified by 
adding the phrase at the time of disposal.134 
One court adopting the passive view of disposal, however, has 
alleged that the active interpretation contravenes the purposes of 
CERCLA by establishing a perverse set of incentives for the own-
ers of land. This court argued that adoption of the active reading of 
disposal allows owners of land who know that passive migration is 
occurring on their land to do nothing and to allow the environmen-
tal contamination to spread unabated.13s So long as the landowner 
manages to sell the land before response costs are incurred, the ar-
gument continues, the landowner could avoid liability for such con-
duct under the active definition. Interpreting CERCLA's liability 
scheme so as to discourage voluntary cleanup appears to contra-
vene the purposes of the statute. 
This argument, however, makes three false assumptions. First, 
the argument assumes that without a passive definition of disposal 
CERCLA does not adequately deter sellers attempting to evade li-
ability through fraudulent transfers of land. Such an assumption, 
however, is patently untrue. CERCLA - as amended by SARA 
- defines such a landowner as liable under section 101(35)(C).136 
Because the landowner with knowledge faces mandatory liability as 
a present owner even if the property is transferred, such a land-
owner faces no economic incentive to transfer ownership of the 
land. The statute also provides for criminal penalties of fines and 
133. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985). 
134. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988). 
135. In the course of rejecting a lower court's adoption of the active definition, the 
Fourth Circuit stated: 
Under the [active] view, an owner could avoid liability simply by standing idle while an 
environmental hazard festers on his property. Such an owner could insulate himself 
from liability by virtue of his passivity, so long as he transfers the proP.erty before any 
response costs are incurred .... A CERCLA regime which rewards indifference to envi-
ronmental hazards and discourages voluntary efforts at waste cleanup cannot be what 
Congress had in mind. 
Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845-46 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
113 S. a. 377 (1992). For one court's refutation of this argument, see United States v. Peter-
sen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1351 (N.D. Ill. 1992). 
136. See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text. 
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imprisonment for landowners who refuse to report releases on their 
property.131 
Second, the argument assumes that the seller can easily rid her-
self of the contaminated property by way of a bad-faith transfer of 
the property before incurring any response costs. CERCLA, how-
ever, provides many incentives for potential buyers to inspect care-
fully any potential land purchase in order to guard against 
liability.138 Fmding the proverbial sucker on whom to unload land 
containing hazardous waste may be far more difficult than antici-
pated by this skeptical court. 
Finally, the argument assumes that federal law.must provide the 
solution to the problem of the deceptive seller. State law, however, 
has historically provided a rescission remedy for buyers who have 
been victimized by sellers who misrepresent or who fail to disclose 
dangerous latent defects in their real estate.139 In combination, 
then, these three factors should establish a sufficient counter to any 
disincentive that the CERCLA liability scheme appears to provide. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The definition of disposal in RCRA as incorporated by refer-
ence in CERCLA seems ambiguous as to whether affirmative con-
duct is required for liability to attach to prior owners. The 
interpretive question is whether Congress intended disposal to have 
an active or a passive meaning. The plain meaning of the defini-
tional language, although it points tentatively to the active construc-
tion, does not answer this question. The histories of RCRA and 
CERCLA, however, tend to support the active interpretation. Fi-
nally, the structure and purposes of CERCLA confirm the active . 
meaning of disposal. 
Adopting the passive interpretation amounts to taking one word 
- leaking - out of its context in the definition and ignoring alter-
native definitions. This approach runs contrary to settled principles 
of statutory construction. It would arbitrarily impose liability along 
the entire chain of ownership of a parcel of land after any initial 
contamination. It would eviscerate a defense for innocent purchas-
137. 42 u.s.c. § 9603 (1988). 
138. The fact that CERCLA imposes strict liability without fault on present landowners 
regardless of the time of release is the primary incentive of this type. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(a)(l) (1988); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1988) (providing that in order to qual-
ify for the innocent purchaser defense, the potential claimant must not have had reason to 
know of any contamination). 
139. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Glickman, 50 N.Y.S.2d 489 (Sup. Ct.), modified, 51 N.Y.S.2d 
96 (App. Div.), second appeal denied, 51 N.Y.S.2d 861 (1944); Lawson v. Citizens & S. Natl. 
Bank of S.C., 193 S.E.2d 124 (S.C. 1972); see also REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs 
§ 161 cmt. d (1979) ("A seller of real or personal property is, for example, ordinarily ex-
pected to disclose a known latent defect of quality or title that is of such a character as would 
probably prevent the bu!er from buying at the contract price."); id. § 161 cmt. d, illus. 4. 
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ers specifically adopted by Congress to protect them from the 
harshness of the CERCLA liability scheme. Finally, it would be 
inconsistent with the statute as a whole and would render other 
provisions of the statute beyond understanding. 
By adopting the active interpretation, courts better comply with 
congressional intent. The active reading reflects a superior under-
standing of the delicate compromise that resulted in CERCLA's 
scheme of liability. It protects prior landowners who committed no 
environmental wrong. Most importantly, however, adoption of the 
active interpretation of disposal ensures that section 107(a)(2) lia-
bility falls where it was intended: on those entities that received the 
economic benefits of introducing the hazardous substances into the 
environment or that refused to halt the spread of such substances 
when they had the chance. 
